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I’m going to offer a novel defense of a commonsense but rarely 
championed solution to the notorious puzzle of the statue and the piece of 
clay. The puzzle itself is familiar. An artist takes a single piece of clay and 
moulds it into a statue. Later, she decides she is unhappy with her work, 
and squashes the statue back into an amorphous lump. During the time 
when the statue exists, it is located in exactly the same place as the piece of 
clay from which it is made. But the statue and the piece of clay seem to have 
different properties. For example, the piece of clay was around before the 
statue was, and it remains even after the statue is gone. So we begin to feel 
pressure to say something bizarre: that the statue and the piece of clay are 
distinct objects even though they occupy the same place at once.  
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Here is a commonsense - almost naive - solution to this puzzle. When 
the artist works on the piece of clay, it becomes a statue rather than becoming 
colocated with a (distinct) statue. That is, it begins to instantiate the sortal 
property being a statue. And when it is squashed, it ceases to instantiate that 
property and goes back to being a humble, amorphous lump. On this view, 
being a statue is a phase sortal property that can be temporarily instantiated 
by things like pieces of clay.1 
            This approach to the puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay, which 
Korman [2015: 204-5] has dubbed phasalism, does not require colocation, 
four-dimensionalism, eliminativism about ordinary objects, deflationism 
about ordinary objects, or unorthodox theses about classical identity. Yet it 
has only very occasionally been endorsed in the literature (for example, see 
Ayers [1974: 128-129], Jubien [2001: 6-7], and Schwartz [2009: 613-15]), and 
it isn’t even represented in some prominent surveys of available solutions 
to the puzzle (for example, Rea [1999] and Wasserman [2018]). 
Nevertheless, I believe it is a promising solution.  
In section 2 I will sketch a novel version of phasalism, and in section 
3 I will show how my version of phasalism can be used to answer some of 
the objections to phasalism that have appeared in the literature. In section 
4 I will sketch a broader metaphysical picture in which the phasalist 
approach to the statue puzzle finds a home, and I will consider the extent 
to which this broader picture helps solve other puzzles of material 
coincidence.  
                                               
1 The term ‘phase sortal’ is due to Wiggins [1967: 7].  
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2 A New Phasalist Metaphysics 
 
The basic commitment of the phasalist solution to the statue puzzle 
is that being a statue is a phase sortal property, but we will need more than 
that basic commitment to rebut common objections to the view. Markosian 
[2010] has developed an account of identity under a sortal – that is, an 
account of what it is for an object at one time to be the same φ as an object 
at another time - which he suggests in passing could be used in the service 
of a phasalist solution to the statue puzzle [ibid.: 144]. I think he’s on to 
something, so I will sketch a similar account of identity under a sortal, but 
one which draws heavily on elements of stage theory, resulting in a kind of 
stage theory for endurantists.2  
The stage theorist believes that ordinary objects are, in a certain 
sense, instantaneous objects. Each ordinary object is present at only a single 
moment of time, but persists in virtue of having counterparts, called stages, 
at other times (see Hawley [2001] and Sider [2001: 188-208]). So a statue is 
present at a single moment of time but persists by having statue-
counterparts at other times. The endurantist can make similar use of a 
notion analogous to a stage, namely, an ordinary object state.  
An ordinary object state is any state of affairs that consists of a 
particular ordinary object instantiating all of the properties it instantiates at 
                                               
2 By contrast, Markosian’s account could be aptly characterized as perdurantism for 
endurantists.   
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a particular instant in its career.3 For example, at any particular instant in 
the career of a statue, Athena, there is an ordinary object state that consists 
of Athena instantiating all of the properties it instantiates at that instant, 
such as a certain size, shape, mass, spatiotemporal location, and so forth. 
Let’s call the object which instantiates the properties in a given ordinary 
object state the instantiator of that state.  
With this terminology, we can reformulate the question of what it 
means for objects to be the same φ as the question of what it means for the 
instantiators of ordinary object states to be the same φ. I suggest a 
counterpart-theoretic answer: what it means for the instantiator of an 
ordinary object state, s1, to be the same φ as the instantiator of an ordinary 
object state, s2, is for s1 to be a φ-counterpart of s2.4 But of course this doesn’t 
tell us much until we know something about the conditions under which 
ordinary object states qualify as φ-counterparts. Minimally, they must be 
φ-states, that is, states in which the instantiator instantiates φ-ness. But 
what else?  
Here we can take another cue from stage theory, which claims that 
stages are φ-counterparts only if they satisfy standard sortalist5 conditions 
on sameness for φs. Many philosophers believe that there are conditions of 
                                               
3 This notion of an ordinary object state is based on similar notions that appear in, e.g., 
Hirsch [1982].  
4 This parallels Markosian’s [2010: 137] episodic account of identity under a sortal.   
5 I borrow this term from Goldwater [2018].  
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sameness associated with each sortal property such that x is the same φ as 
y if and only if x and y satisfy the sameness conditions for φs. These 
sameness conditions often require a certain kind of continuity over time. 
For example, the conditions associated with being a statue might require 
continuity of shape; the conditions associated with being a person might 
require psychological continuity; and so on.  
Most philosophers construe these sortalist continuity conditions as 
conditions on the persistence of objects which instantiate the relevant sortal 
property. So if an object which is a statue ceases to satisfy the same-statue 
conditions, it ceases to persist altogether - contrary to the phasalist view 
that an object, such as a piece of clay, can persist through ceasing to be a 
statue. But I will instead take these sortalist conditions on sameness for φs 
as merely conditions on being the same φ, where this is understood in the 
counterpart-theoretic way formulated above. A pair of ordinary object 
states are φ-counterparts, and therefore states of the same φ, if and only if 
they are continuous in the way appropriate for φs. I will sometimes speak 
of the sameness or identity associated with a sortal, φ, as sortal identity with 
respect to φ, or simply sortal identity, where the context makes it clear 
which sortal is in view.  
This account reconciles the phasalist and sortalist identity conditions 
for objects by taking the phasalist conditions to be conditions on classical 
identity, while taking the sortalist conditions as conditions on identity of 
another kind. This allows us to say that both the phasalist and the sortalist 
have been getting something right. And as we will see, we can make sense 
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of cases where the phasalist and the sortalist claims about persistence come 
apart by suggesting that, in those cases, classical identity and identity of 
another kind are coming apart.  
The phasalist may also wish to supplement this account with a 
semantics modelled on the stage theorist’s semantics. According to stage 
theory, the truth conditions of ordinary language sentences feature stages. 
Consider the sentence ‘Athena is statue-shaped.’ The stage theorist claims 
that ‘Athena’ refers to a certain stage, and the sentence is true if and only if 
that stage is statue-shaped. Whereas ‘Athena was statue-shaped yesterday’, 
where ‘Athena’ refers to a present stage, is true if and only if that stage has 
a counterpart yesterday that is statue-shaped. If Athena is destroyed and 
becomes a merely past object, then a sentence like ‘Athena was statue-
shaped’ is true if and only if, at some past time, there is an Athena stage 
that is statue-shaped. And so on. With sufficient ingenuity, the stage 
theorist can supply truth conditions for the wide variety of ordinary 
language sentences about persisting objects [Sider 2006: 108-11].6  
                                               
6 I take the stage theorist’s semantics to be what Sider [2011] calls a metaphysical semantics. 
A metaphysical semantics differs from a linguistic semantics in that it tries to give 
fundamental truth conditions for ordinary language sentences which may not fill all the 
same roles that meanings in the traditional linguistic sense do. For example, they may not 
mirror the syntax of the sentences that express them, and they may not be transparent to 
competent speakers. A referee wonders whether the use of a metaphysical semantics 
counts against my claim to be defending a commonsense solution to the statue puzzle. 
Perhaps it does to some extent. But, following Sattig [2015], I aim to use metaphysical 
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The endurantist can supply analogous truth conditions featuring 
ordinary object states in place of stages. Let’s say that an object x has 
property P at an ordinary object state s if and only if x is the instantiator of 
s, and P is one of the properties P1-Pn such that s consists of x instantiating 
P1-Pn. Then ‘Athena is statue-shaped’ is true if and only if Athena is statue-
shaped at its present ordinary object state; ‘Athena was statue-shaped 
yesterday’ is true if and only if Athena has an ordinary object state 
yesterday at which Athena is statue-shaped; ‘Athena was statue-shaped’ is 
true if and only if, at some past time, there is an ordinary object state at 
which Athena is statue-shaped; and so on.  
But there is an important twist in the stage theorist’s semantics that 
the phasalist should emulate. The stage theorist claims that singular terms 
are associated with certain corresponding sortal terms, and so with certain 
counterpart relations. For example, the name ‘Athena’ might be associated 
with the sortal term ‘statue’, and so with the statue counterpart relation. 
Therefore, ‘Athena was statue-shaped yesterday’ is true if and only if the 
stage which ‘Athena’ denotes has a statue counterpart at a past time that is 
statue-shaped.  
In a similar vein, I propose that a singular term is associated, not 
merely with a sortal, φ, but with what I will call a family of φ-states. A family 
of φ-states is a maximal set, S, of φ-counterparts, by which I mean that each 
                                               




member of S is a φ-counterpart of every member of S, and no state that is 
not a member of S is a φ-counterpart of every member of S.7 This includes 
not merely temporal counterparts, but also modal counterparts in other 
possible worlds. So the name ‘Athena’ might be associated with a family of 
statue-states, S, in which case ‘Athena is statue-shaped’ is true if and only 
if Athena is statue-shaped at the current member of S; ‘Athena was statue-
shaped yesterday’ is true if and only if, yesterday, there was a member of S 
at which Athena was statue-shaped; ‘Athena was statue-shaped’ is true if 
and only if, at some past time, there is a member of S at which Athena is 
statue-shaped; and so on.   
 
3 Answering Objections to Phasalism 
 
Having sketched a phasalist account of identity under a sortal and a 
supplementary semantics, we are now in a position to see how it can be 
used to defend phasalism against some of the objections that have been 
raised against it in the literature.  
Part of what motivates the thought that the piece of clay both 
precedes and outlives the statue is the intuition that, when the artist forms 
the statue, she creates it, that is, causes it to come into existence; and when 
she squashes the statue, she destroys it, that is, causes it to go out of 
existence. I will call this the creation/destruction intuition. It doesn’t sit 
                                               
7 This is modelled on Lewis’s [1976] characterization of a maximal series of person stages 
and Markosian’s [2010] parallel characterization of an episode.  
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well with phasalism because creation and destruction are not mere phase 
sortal changes. This worry is voiced, for example, by Burke [1994: 592], 
Sider [2006: 103-4], and Korman [2015: 204-6]. In what follows, I will focus 
mostly on creation, though my remarks will have obvious parallels for 
destruction.  
I’ll begin by casting a seed of doubt on the idea that a new object 
begins to exist at the point when a pre-existing piece of clay is moulded 
statue-wise. It sounds natural to say that the artist who moulds the piece of 
clay into a statue creates the statue, but it also sounds natural to speak of 
these cases as if they are cases of an object gaining or losing a phase sortal 
property. For example, in ordinary conversation someone might say that 
the piece of clay sitting in the artist’s studio will soon be a beautiful statue, 
or that the statue in the artist’s studio was once nothing but a humble piece 
of clay. This is how we talk about objects gaining and losing phase sortal 
properties. We say, for example, that adults used to be children and that 
children will one day be adults.  
It also sounds natural to my ear to say that the artist is going to make 
the piece of clay into a statue. At face value, locutions of the form ‘making 
an F into a G’ or even just ‘making an F a G’ seem to describe causing an F 
to be a G, as in a phase sortal transition. In fact, we sometimes use locutions 
of this form to describe changes that nearly everyone will grant are phase 
sortal transitions. For example, I might speak of making an inexperienced 
athlete into a champion, or of making a house a home. Other interpretations 
of these expressions are possible of course. Perhaps when we say that the 
artist makes the lump of clay into a statue, we mean that she causes the 
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lump of clay to constitute a statue. But this interpretation has its costs. For 
example, the existence of an ‘is’ of constitution has been challenged on the 
grounds that it fails standard linguistic tests for semantic ambiguity [Pickel 
2010].  
So we are inclined to talk about cases like the statue and lump of clay 
in two different ways. We sometimes speak about cases like this in the way 
we speak about cases where a new object is brought into existence, and we 
sometimes speak about them in the way we speak about phase sortal 
changes. This ambivalence is a sign that perhaps what is going on when a 
lump is moulded statue-wise is not creation as we normally conceive it, but 
some other phenomenon that merely resembles genuine creation. My 
version of phasalism delivers exactly that.   
Creation as we normally conceive it is bringing a new object into 
existence, that is, causing there to be an object which is not classically 
identical to any previously existing objects. But on my version of phasalism 
there is a similar phenomenon that I will call creation under a sortal, or 
more simply, sortal creation. Sortal creation is (roughly) initiating a new 
family of φ states, that is, causing there to be a φ that is not the same φ as 
any previously existing object. An artist who moulds a pre-existing piece of 
clay into a statue sortally creates the statue, because she initiates a new 
family of statue states. This is true even if the instantiator of the statue states 
is classically identical to the instantiator of the prior piece-of-clay states. So 
I suggest that the creation/destruction intuition is tracking sortal creation 
rather than creation as we normally conceive it.  
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If this is right, then we might be mistaken when speak of the statue 
as though its career began when it was sortally created. But alternatively, 
we could apply the phasalist semantics I sketched in section 2 to vindicate 
this way of talking. A singular term like ‘the statue’ is associated with a 
family of statue states, so normally, when we refer to the statue as a statue, 
our claims should be evaluated relative to a family of statue states. Then it 
will be true to say ‘The statue did not exist yesterday’ if there was only an 
amorphous lump on the artist’s desk at that time.  
But there are also two ways that the family of piece-of-clay states, 
which includes but is not exhausted by the statue states, might become 
truth-conditionally relevant instead. One way it might become relevant is 
by using singular terms like ‘the piece of clay’, which are associated with 
that family. But there is also room to suppose that the association between 
a family and a singular term is defeasible. Maybe in some contexts, such as 
contexts where it is salient that the referent of ‘the statue’ persists through 
a sortal change from statue to mere piece of clay or vice versa, a family of 
piece-of-clay states rather than statue states becomes relevant. Then ‘the 
statue used to be nothing but an amorphous piece of clay’ is true, because 
it was an amorphous piece of clay at earlier piece-of-clay-states.  
Finally, what about terms like ‘create’ and ‘make’, when used in 
cases of sortal creation? I am sympathetic to the view that we are speaking 
falsely when we use those terms in cases of sortal creation because we 
mistake sortal creation for genuine creation.8 But alternatively, we could 
                                               
8 Ayers [1974: 128] suggests that we are speaking loosely.  
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extend the phasalist semantics to terms like ‘create’ and ‘make’ in the 
following way. We normally think that creating means (roughly) causing 
something to begin existing. So if x is created at t, then x exists after t but 
not before t. But given that ‘the statue’ is associated with a certain family of 
statue states, S, ‘the statue exists after t but not before’ is true according to 
the phasalist semantics if and only if members of S occur after t but not 
before. So I suggest that ‘the statue is created at t’ is true if and only if 
members of S occur after t but not before. That is, it’s true if and only if S is 
initiated at t.9 
So much for the creation/destruction intuition. There is another 
intuition that seems to clash with phasalism. Suppose that our artist first 
moulds the piece of clay into a statue of a cat, which she names ‘Cat’, and 
later squashes it. And suppose that after Cat has been squashed, another 
artist comes along and moulds that same piece of clay into a statue of a 
hippo, dubbing it ‘Hippo’. Some of us have the intuition that Cat and Hippo 
are not the same statue. Just like many philosophers think psychological 
change which is too discontinuous or simply too extensive disrupts 
personal identity,10 one might also think that the changes in form in the 
Cat/Hippo case are too discontinuous or too extensive for Cat and Hippo 
to be the same statue. Call this the non-sameness intuition. Cases like this 
                                               
9 All of these suggestions have straightforward parallels for ‘destruction’. However, the 
parallel suggestions may be unnecessary if, as a referee suggests, destruction does not 
entail ceasing to exist like elimination and annihilation do.  
10 For example, see Parfit [1975] and Lewis [1976].  
13 
are used to motivate non-phasalist views by, for example, Myro [1999: 
148ff), Hawley [2001: ch. 5), and Korman [2015: 206]. Phasalism identifies 
both Cat and Hippo with the piece of clay, but if both Cat and Hippo are 
identical to the piece of clay, then they are classically identical to each other, 
so how can they fail to be the same statue? 
The phasalist should say that the piece of clay begins to instantiate 
the sortal property being a statue when it is moulded into a cat shape, it 
ceases to instantiate that property when it is squashed, and then it begins 
to instantiate that property a second time when it is moulded into a hippo 
shape. And the phasalist can also say that the piece of clay’s ordinary object 
states during its cat phase are not continuous in the right way with its 
ordinary object states during its hippo phase to qualify as statue-
counterparts of those states. In that case, even though the instantiator of the 
cat states is identical to the instantiator of the hippo states, and even though 
it is a statue at both sets of states, nevertheless it is not the same statue across 
both sets of states.  
But we want to be able to say more than just that the statue is not the 
same statue at its hippo states as it was at its cat states. We also want to be 
able to endorse certain sentences using the names ‘Hippo’ and ‘Cat’, like 
the following:  
 
(Hp) Hippo is not the same statue as Cat.  
(Ct) Cat is the same statue as Cat.  
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Moreover, we want to be able to say both of these things without being 
forced by Leibniz’s Law to deny that Cat and Hippo are classically 
identical.11 I believe there are a number of ways to do this,12 but I will 
illustrate how it can be done with the phasalist semantics I sketched in 
section 2.  
The phasalist could say that the name ‘Hippo’ is associated with the 
family of statue states whose members are the statue-states that occur 
during the part of the piece of clay’s career when it is hippo-shaped, both 
in the actual world and in nearby possible worlds. Call this family of statue 
states H. Similarly, ‘Cat’ is associated with the family of statue states whose 
members occur during the part of the piece of clay’s career when it is cat-
shaped, both in the actual world and in nearby possible worlds. Call this 
family C. Then the phasalist can say that (Hp) attributes to Hippo a 
property that it instantiates if and only if the members of H are not statue-
counterparts of the members of C; whereas (Ct) attributes to Cat a property 
                                               
11 Thanks to a referee for this objection.  
12 Jubien (2001) handles this problem by endorsing the view that names have descriptive 
content. And I am sympathetic to the view that (Hp) and (Ct) are under-specified 
because they are not indexed to different times in Cat/Hippo’s career. Perhaps the 
nearest truth to (Hp) is something like this: when it is hippo-shaped, Hippo is not the 
same statue as Cat is when it is cat-shaped. And perhaps the nearest truth to (Ct) is 
something like this: when it is cat-shaped, Cat is the same statue as Cat is when it is cat-
shaped. Once the indexing to specific parts of Cat/Hippo’s career is added, it is clear that 
the two sentences are not attributing incompatible properties to Cat and Hippo, and so 
the Leibniz’s Law worry dissolves. 
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that it instantiates if and only if the members of C are statue-counterparts 
of the members of C. Then (Hp) and (Ct) both turn out to be true. Moreover, 
(Hp) does not entail that Hippo lacks any property that (Ct) entails that Cat 
has, so Leibniz’s Law does not force us to deny that Hippo and Cat are 
classically identical. 
Finally, my phasalist account of identity under a sortal can help with 
one further objection to phasalism in the literature. The objection claims that 
the statue could survive losing at least some of the clay that it is made of, 
but the piece of clay could not, because the piece of clay is mereologically 
constant, or at least less mereologically flexible than the statue. Versions of 
this objection appear in Thomson [1998: 152ff] and Korman [2015: 205]. See 
also Sidelle [1998: 427]. But if being a statue is a phase sortal property of the 
piece of clay, then the statue is classically identical to the piece of clay, and 
so can’t differ from it mereologically.  
By way of response, I think the phasalist should reject the prevailing 
view that the piece of clay is mereologically constant. On one way of 
developing this thought, the piece of clay is distinct from the clay that it is 
made of, the latter being the plurality of various bits of clay that compose 
the piece of clay. The piece of clay can survive gaining and losing those bits, 
so it can be made of different clay at different times. Ayers [1974: 125-7] 
seems to endorse this view. This is not the place to undertake a full defence 
of this view about the piece of clay and the clay it is made of.13 For present 
                                               
13 But see Carmichael [2020: sec. 4] for a recent defense of the view that talk of the matter 
an object is made of can be paraphrased as talk about pluralities of bits of matter.   
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purposes I only wish to point out that the phasalist could account for the 
intuition that the statue is not made of the same piece of clay anymore after 
it loses some of its original clay by suggesting that this intuition is tracking 
identity under the sortal being a piece of clay, not classical identity.  
More precisely, the phasalist could say that the instantiator of the 
piece-of-clay-states that occur before the statue loses some clay is classically 
identical to the instantiator of the piece-of-clay-states that occur after it loses 
some clay, without being the same piece of clay. This would be the case if 
the former states were not piece-of-clay-counterparts of the latter states. 
And that would be true if the instantiators of closely neighboring piece-of-
clay states must share all the same clay parts in order to be piece-of-clay 
counterparts. 
 
4 The Bigger Picture 
 
What I have said about the statue and the piece of clay is 
representative of a bigger metaphysical picture. It is standard to claim that, 
while some sortal properties, like being a child, are phase sortal properties, 
others are so-called substance sortal properties. A substance sortal property 
is one that an object has permanently and is (or is similar to) an Aristotelian 
kind [Wiggins 2001]. But following Marjorie Price [1977], I reject the view 
that there are substance sortal properties. Rather, on my view, all of the 
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sortal properties instantiated by ordinary objects are phase sortal 
properties.14  
What then instantiates phase sortal properties? Though I think there 
are a few ways the phasalist could go here, I am inclined to the view that 
phase sortal properties are instantiated by what Armstrong [1997: 123] calls 
‘thin particulars’, where a thin particular is ‘the particular in abstraction 
from its properties’. For Armstrong, properties are ‘ways things are’, and 
thin particulars are the things that are those ways [ibid.: 30]. So the thin 
particular instantiates properties, but those properties are not parts or 
constituents of it. For example, a statue is a thin particular that instantiates 
the sortal property being a statue, but it doesn’t have that property (or any 
other property) as a part or constituent.  
It’s plausible that a given thin particular must always instantiate 
some sortal property or other, but of course it doesn’t follow that there is 
some sortal property or other that a given thin particular must always 
instantiate. My view is that thin particulars are always objects of some sort, 
but which sort of object they are may vary across the course of their careers. 
Relatedly, objects are never destroyed by mere sortal changes; they are only 
destroyed by events which suffice to terminate all the forms of sortal 
                                               
14 There will be trivial exceptions if we are generous about what counts as a sortal property. 
For example, let’s say an object instantiates being a lifelong statue if and only if it is a statue 
for the entirety of its career. An object cannot instantiate this property for only a temporary 
phase of its career like it can with a phase sortal property. But I doubt anyone would want 
to say that this somewhat gerrymandered sortal is a substance sortal either.  
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continuity an object exhibits. Candidates for events of this sort include 
breaking apart, decomposing, being annihilated, and so forth.  
On this ambitious version of phasalism, not only is being a statue a 
phase sortal property that can be temporarily instantiated by a thin 
particular that is also a piece of clay; even being a piece of clay is a phase sortal 
property that can be temporarily instantiated by that thin particular. 
Having rejected the view that pieces of clay are mereologically constant, a 
thin particular that is a piece of clay might become, for example, a piece of 
wax by gradually replacing tiny bits of its clay with tiny bits of wax, or 
perhaps by using sophisticated futuristic technology to manipulate its 
chemical structure. So a thin particular which is both a statue and a piece of 
clay need not be either of those things permanently.15  
                                               
15 A referee worries that phasalism will turn out, contrary to my intentions, to be an 
eliminativist view. For one thing, the position that being a statue is a phase sortal property 
of (a thin particular that is also) a piece of clay entails that the statue is not a further thing 
in the world in addition to the piece of clay. That might sound like an eliminativist view 
of statues. And if all other sortal properties are phase sortal properties too, one might 
wonder if sortal properties will turn out, at bottom, to be phase sortal properties of 
pluralities of atoms, which would entail that ordinary objects are not further things in the 
world in addition to those atoms. That sounds even more like eliminativism. But 
something has gone wrong, because I do not eliminate children from my ontology by 
believing, as most of us do, that being a child is a phase sortal property of human beings. 
Here’s what I think is going on. Statues could fail to be further objects in the world in 
addition to things like pieces of clay either because (i) they don’t exist at all or because (ii) 
they exist but are identical to pieces of clay. Option (i) is eliminativist because it entails that 
there are no statues. But (ii)  is non-eliminativist because it does not entail that there are no 
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Because my ambitious phasalism is so profligate with phase sortal 
properties, it is well-equipped to handle other coincidence puzzles that are 
structurally parallel to the statue puzzle. For example, consider the well-
worn puzzle about the sweater and the thread.16 Suppose someone knits a 
single, long thread into a sweater. Then a sweater and a thread are located 
in exactly the same place at the same time. But they seem to have different 
properties. For example, the thread was around before the sweater was. 
And if the sweater is torn in such a way that it retains its integrity as a 
sweater, but is no longer made of a single thread, then the sweater will 
outlive the thread. If the sweater is unraveled instead of torn, then the 
thread will outlive the sweater. And if the thread is later knitted into a scarf, 
it seems like the scarf is not the same garment as the sweater. So there is 
pressure to say something bizarre: that the sweater and the thread are 
distinct objects even though they occupy the same place at once.  
                                               
statues. To the contrary, it entails that there are statues, because it entails that some things 
(namely, pieces of clay) instantiate being a statue. And phasalism is a version of this latter, 
non-eliminativist view. This is true even if being a statue is a phase sortal property of some 
atoms. Speaking for myself, I deny that it is possible for some atoms to instantiate being a 
statue as opposed to merely being arranged statue-wise, and I do not see why even my 
extreme version of phasalism would require me to say otherwise. But even if a phasalist 
were to endorse the view that being a statue is a phase sortal property of some atoms, this 
would still be a non-eliminativist view, since it entails that there are statues.  
16 The case first appears in a footnote in Wiggins [1968], but for a more detailed version see 
Hawley [2001: ch. 5]. 
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For the most part, the phasalist can say the same things about this 
case that she says about the statue case. A single thin particular, p, begins 
as a thread and, when it is knitted, it begins to be a sweater as well. If p is 
unravelled, it may cease to be a sweater without ceasing to be a thread, and 
it might later begin to be something else, like a scarf. And given their 
differences and the discontinuity between them, the sweater states and 
scarf states are not garment-counterparts. So as the instantiator of the 
sweater states, p, is not the same garment as it was when it was the 
instantiator of the scarf states. What about the case where the sweater is 
torn? On my ambitious version of phasalism, being a thread is a phase sortal 
just as being a sweater is. So when p is torn, p ceases to instantiate being a 
thread without ceasing to instantiate being a sweater.  
That said, the intuition that a new object is created when the thread 
is knitted into a garment seems stronger in this case than the statue case. 
But that isn’t surprising, as the resemblance to genuine creation and 
destruction is greater too. Knitting a single thread into a sweater is a very 
similar process to knitting multiple threads into a sweater - a genuine case 
of creation. It also involves causing the parts which compose the thread to 
satisfy the conditions for composing something, but in a new way that is 
independent of whether they compose a thread.17 And to accomplish this, 
the knitter manipulates the thread in a way that resembles assembling a 
new object: they bring parts of the thread closer together, secure them to 
                                               
17 This adapts Ayers’s [1974: 132-3] point about the sweater satisfying two principles of 
unity at once.  
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one another, etc. So the resemblance to genuine creation is enormous, but 
for the phasalist the key difference remains: the sweater is made from a 
single object. It looks like genuine creation, but it isn’t. (Parallel points apply 
to unravelling and destruction.) 
Similar moves can be made to handle coincidence between a flag and 
a piece of cloth, [Baker 2007: 35], or between a drivers’ license and a piece 
of plastic [ibid.: 27], or between a tree and a hunk of wood [Wiggins 1968], 
and so forth. And others have argued that being a person is a phase sortal 
property of an organism or a body (for example, Olson [1997] and 
Markosian [2010]). But phasalism is less helpful for solving coincidence 
puzzles that have a different structure than the statue puzzle. I am thinking 
in particular of cases where an object seems to become coincident with one 
of its proper parts. One famous representative of this sort of coincidence is 
the case of Tibbles and Tib [Wiggins 1968]. Tibbles is a cat and Tib is the 
proper part of Tibbles that includes all of her except her tail. Suppose 
Tibbles loses her tail. Cats can survive losing their tails, so Tibbles survives 
this change. And presumably Tib can survive ceasing to be attached to a 
tail, so Tib survives too. But now Tibbles is coincident with Tib.  
Can the phasalist solve this puzzle simply by saying that being a cat 
is a phase sortal property of arbitrary undetached parts like Tib? That 
would allow the phasalist to say that Tib simply begins instantiating the 
property being a cat when Tibbles loses her tail. But that doesn’t fully solve 
the puzzle, for Tib does not merely seem to become coincident with a cat; 
she seems to become coincident with Tibbles in particular. And Tibbles 
once had a tail, while Tib never did, so Tibbles and Tib are distinct.  
22 
The phasalist could address this by allowing that ordinary object 
states with classically distinct instantiators can nevertheless be 
counterparts. Then she can say that the instantiator of the cat states after the 
tail is lost is the same cat as the instantiator of the cat states before the tail is 
lost, despite being classically distinct from it.18 But once we allow that 
ordinary object states with classically distinct instantiators can be 
counterparts, phasalism begins to look a lot more like standard stage theory 
– perhaps too much so for some endurantists. Speaking for myself, I prefer 
to solve the Tibbles puzzle by appealing to a version of the view that there 
is no such object as Tib.19  
Some will regard it as a weakness of the phasalist approach that it 
works best for some coincidence puzzles, like the statue, but must step aside 
and allow a different story to be told about others, like Tibbles [Burke 1994: 
592]. But it is not a crippling weakness, and it is at least partly compensated 
by the fact that the phasalist approach is more unified than many rival 
views in a different respect. For the phasalist says that all sortal changes are 
phase sortal changes, while (non-eliminativist) rivals classify some sortal 
changes, like a child growing into an adult, as phase sortal changes, while 
telling a different story about cases like the statue and the piece of clay.20 
                                               
18 This solution mimics the stage-theoretic solution to the Tibbles puzzle [Sider 2001: 142-
3, 152-3]. The notion of sameness relations between classically distinct objects appears in a 
number of authors, including Markosian [2010].   
19 For two different versions of this view see van Inwagen [1981] and Carmichael [2020].    





I have argued that my phasalist account of identity under a sortal 
can be used to rebut certain objections to the phasalist approach to the 
puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay. I have also briefly indicated what 
a more general phasalist metaphysics might look like, and how it could be 
used to solve other coincidence puzzles that are structurally similar to the 
puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay. There is much more to say about 
phasalism, but I hope that what I have managed to say here is enough to 
bring more attention to the unduly neglected phasalist approach to puzzles 
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